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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
     Daniel J. Culnen was a 73% stockholder in Wedgewood Associates, a 
subchapter (s) corporation in the restaurant business.  When Wedgewood 
ceased doing 
business, it made an assignment for the benefit of creditors, abandoned 
its furniture and 
fixtures, and reported a net loss of $2,410,941.  Culnen's tax return for 
the same year 
showed his 73% share of the Form 4797 loss to be $1,759,987.  The 
Commissioner 
disallowed Culnen's deduction of the loss.  On appeal, the Tax Court ruled 
not that the 
loss was improperly deducted by Culnen, but, rather, that Wedgewood's loss 
for tax 
purposes was not the amount claimed, but was, instead, $515,243.  We will 
REVERSE 
the Tax Court's ruling. 
     The deficiency notice sent by the IRS to Culnen disallowed Culnen's 
pro rata 
share of Wedgewood's loss: 
                    It has been determined that you did not sustain the 
$1,759,987.00 loss, 
          allegedly derived from your ownership interest in Wedgewood 
Associates 
          Inc., reported on your return for the 1990 taxable year.  In the 
event that a 
          court of competent jurisdiction determines that you did sustain, 
all or a 
          portion of such reported loss, you are not entitled to a 
deduction for such 
          loss for the following reasons: (1) you have failed to establish 
that you have 
          adequate basis in your interest in Wedgewood Associates Inc.  to 
deduct 
          any of this reported loss amount; (2) the amount of this 
reported loss 
          exceeds your basis in the stock and debt of Wedgewood Associates 
Inc.  
          pursuant to the provisions of I.R.C. Section 1366(d)(1); (3) 
such reported 
          loss exceeds the amount for which you were at risk during the 
1990 taxable 
          year under the provisions of I.R.C. Section 465; (4) the 
reported loss is not 
          deductible since such loss is considered a passive activity loss 
which is not 
          deductible under the provisions of I.R.C. Section 469; and (5) 
the reported 
          loss is not deductible under the provisions of I.R.C. Section 
267(a) since 
          the parties to the transaction(s) which generated such loss are 
related 
          parties under provisions of I.R.C. Section 267(b). 
 
     Culnen was, therefore, put on notice that he had the burden to 
establish his basis 
in his stock and establish its deductibility, meeting the challenge that 
it was passive 
activity loss, and its disallowance based on the theory that the parties 
to the transactions 
were related parties.  The deficiency notice did not challenge Wedgewood's 
loss, but 
only Culnen's ability to deduct his pro rata share of the loss.  The 
pleadings, pretrial 
motions, status reports, trial memoranda, and trial transcripts all focus 
on the amount of 
his loss and his pro rata share. 
     At trial, Wedgewood's tax preparer testified as to the nature and 
amount of the 
loss, specifically, that it consisted of the acquisition price of 
furniture and fixtures less 
depreciation based upon the fact that the corporation had essentially 
abandoned the 
furniture and fixtures to an assignee for the benefit of creditors.  
Culnen offered evidence 
to prove his basis, specifically the nature and amount of his investments 
over time, many 
of which were made through his partnership, Culnen & Hamilton, and he 
offered 
evidence to refute the IRS' contention regarding the related party and 
passive activity 
issues. 
     At the conclusion of the trial, the government argued for the first 
time, and the 
Tax Court considered, whether Wedgewood correctly calculated the losses 
resulting from 
the assignment pursuant to I.R.C. Section 1001.  Culnen objected to the 
consideration of 
this issue, since it had never been raised in the deficiency notice, or 
raised in the course 
of pre-trial proceedings.  It is undisputed that the government produced 
no evidence 
relating to the corporate-level loss issue. 
     In its opinion, the Tax Court framed the issue as follows: 
                    Respondent disallowed petitioner's pro rata share of 
Wedgewood's 
          ordinary losses for 1987, 1989, and 1990 because petitioner 
failed to 
          convince respondent that he had an adequate basis with respect 
to his 
          investment in Wedgewood.  We must determine that basis.  
Respondent 
          disallowed petitioner's share of the Form 4797 loss (the 
$1,759,987 loss) 
          for the same reason and because petitioner failed to convince 
respondent 
          that Wedgewood suffered the $1,759,987 loss.  We must determine 
both 
          his basis and whether Wedgewood suffered any loss.  (emphasis 
added) 
     The Tax Court then proceeded to review the evidence offered, and 
concluded that 
Culnen had indeed proven that he had an adequate basis with respect to his 
investment in 
Wedgewood.  The Tax Court then turned its attention to the issue of the 
Form 4797 loss 
and embarked upon a discussion of Section 1001 of the Internal Revenue 
Code and its 
definition of "amount realized," noting that the regulations provide that, 
for purposes of 
that section, the sale or the disposition of property that secures a 
nonrecourse liability 
discharges that liability, and that, according to the regulations, the 
"amount realized" 
from the sale or disposition of the property includes the amount of 
liabilities from which 
the transferor is discharged as a result of the disposition.  The court 
then noted, 
"Respondent's position is that Wedgewood did not realize any loss." 
     The court then criticized Culnen's failure to adduce proof regarding 
the amount 
realized on the sale of the furniture and fixtures, and his failure to 
show that the 
indebtedness secured by the liens on those assets was nonrecourse.  The 
court then made 
an assumption that the debt was nonrecourse and that the "amount realized" 
for tax 
purposes would include the amount of the liens, namely $1,865,000.  After 
making other 
mathematical calculations, the court concluded that the "amount realized" 
was 
$1,991,001, and, since the adjusted basis was $2,506,244, Wedgewood's loss 
was 
$515,243, and petitioner's pro rata share was therefore $376,127. 
     Culnen contends that we should either reverse the ruling of the Tax 
Court based 
upon the theory of "meet the hold," or should remand for a determination 
regarding the 
section 1001 issue, since the Tax Court ruled without any evidentiary 
basis.  We hold 
that, whether based on "meet the hold," or simply notice principles of due 
process, we 
will reverse because the Tax Court improperly ruled against Culnen based 
on an issue as 
to which Culnen was never advised  - namely a last minute challenge to the 
amount of 
Wedgewood's loss.  The Court did determine, however, that Culnen did 
prevail on the 
issues raised in the deficiency notice.  Accordingly, Culnen is entitled 
to prevail on the 
claims raised in the deficiency notice, and judgment should be entered in 
his favor. 
     At oral argument, counsel for the Commissioner urged that the 
deficiency notice's 
reference to "adequate basis in your interest" and "reported loss exceeds 
your basis" were 
sufficient to put Culnen on notice that the amount of the corporate loss 
was under attack.  
We disagree.  To the contrary, the deficiency notice was addressed to 
Culnen, and never 
referenced Wedgewood except as it related to Culnen's stock or interest in 
the 
corporation.  The notice stated, "It has been determined that you did not 
sustain the 
$1,759,987 loss allegedly derived from your ownership interest in 
Wedgewood 
Associates, Inc. reported on your return for the 1990 taxable year."  The 
emphasis on 
"you" and "your" clearly communicates that the notice was addressed to 
Culnen's loss, 
not Wedgewood's.  We note that Wedgewood's loss, and its amount, has never 
been 
challenged by the IRS, and there is no evidence that its loss was ever 
determined to be an 
amount other than the amount used by Culnen in calculating the amount of 
his deduction 
for purposes of the Form 4797.  While the IRS would be free to attack the 
amount of 
Wedgewood's loss in a deficiency notice addressed to it, or as part of an 
attack on 
Culnen's deduction of a percentage thereof, this challenge was never made 
since the 
corporate loss issue was never raised in the deficiency notice, or in any 
of the pretrial 
proceedings.  Rather, it appears to have surfaced only when it appeared 
that Culnen 
could in fact trace his investments and show his basis in the stock he 
owned and, thus, 
prove the allowability of the deduction he claimed. 
     Among the principles animating our conclusion is the "meet the hold" 
doctrine 
Culnen suggests.  That doctrine prohibits a party from changing his ground 
and "putting 
his conduct upon another and different consideration."  Ohio & Mississippi 
Railway Co. 
v. McCarthy, 96 U.S. 258, 267 (1878).   The fairness concerns that 
underlie this principle 
are consistent with the most elementary requirements of due process.  
Here, we are 
troubled by the total lack of notice of the nature of the IRS's claim so 
as to inform 
Culnen of the proof he must present, given his burden in a proceeding to 
challenge the 
deficiency notice.  More than an inequitable change of position, the 
Commissioner 
essentially asserted an entirely new claim.  Perhaps the situation would 
be different if the 
notice of deficiency had consisted of a vague challenge to the loss, but 
later proceedings 
had made clear the nature of the IRS's theory.  However, here, the 
numerous stipulations 
and record statements regarding the issues are devoid of any mention of 
attack on 
Wedgewood's loss, let alone specific contention that the "amount realized" 
was being 
challenged based on the provisions and regulations under section 1001 
regarding 
recourse debt and dischargeability.  The stipulations and various 
statements of the issues 
say nothing remotely touching on this issue.  Further, the surprise and 
disadvantage to 
Culnen are obvious from the record and result.  In Commissioner v.  
Transport Mfg. & 
Equip.  Co., 478 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1973) the court noted that the 
taxpayer must be 
advised of the theory being advanced by the Commissioner: "The failure to 
advise the 
taxpayer of such information is extremely prejudicial.  Deficiency 
assessments are 
usually presumptively correct, and the taxpayer has the burden to prove 
them wrong.  
The taxpayer works at an extreme disadvantage in trying to invalidate 
deficiency 
assessments if he does not specifically know why the Commissioner is 
challenging the 
taxpayer."  Id at 735. 
     Here the theories set forth in the notice of deficiency were 
successfully rebutted by 
Culnen's evidence.       Accordingly, we will reverse the Tax Court's 
order and remand for 
entry of judgment in favor of Culnen. 
________________________ 
________________________ 
TO THE CLERK OF COURT: 




                                   /s/Marjorie O. Rendell 
                                   Circuit Judge 
 
